

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00330 01 OF 02 101157Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 INRE-00
NSCE-00 ICAE-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13 L-03
NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15
TRSE-00 /078 W

-----021812 101220Z /47

O P 101123Z JUN 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2927
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS BEL PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0330

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
SUBJ: MBFR: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS

1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT TEXT OF A PRELIMINARY AD HOC GROUP
REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8
AS TENTATIVELY AGREED BY FRG, UK, AND US ON JUNE 9. IT
IS INTENDED TO SUBMIT THIS DRAFT FOR APPROVAL BY THE AHG
ON JUNE 14. THE REPORT PROVIDES A FIRST ANALYSIS OF
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EAST'S JUNE 8 PROPOSALS WHICH
MAY BE OF USE TO WASHINGTON AGENCIES IN EVALUATING THESE
PROPOSALS.

BEGIN TEXT

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS

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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00330 01 OF 02 101157Z

THIS PAPER IS A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE EASTERN
PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8, 1978. IT IS BASED ON THE EASTERN TEXT
AND EASTERN CLARIFICATIONS PROVIDED THUS FAR. THIS ANALYSIS
IS A TENTATIVE ONE; NO OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL IS YET FEASIBLE SINCE A NUMBER OF
IMPORTANT DETAILS ARE STILL OPEN. CONSEQUENTLY, IT MAY BE
SOME WEEKS BEFORE THE AD HOC GROUP IS IN A POSITION TO OFFER

A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NEW PROPOSALS.

A. GENERAL

THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS MAKE NO ATTEMPT TO MEET THE FUNDAMENTAL WESTERN CONCERN ON MANPOWER DISPARITIES. THEY ARE PREDICATED ON WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE DATA ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER TABLED BY THE EAST. THEY THEREFORE PROVIDE NO INDICATION THAT THE EAST IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN REQUIREMENT THAT AN MBFR AGREEMENT SHOULD ELIMINATE THE PACT'S LARGE MANPOWER SUPERIORITY. THUS, THESE PROPOSALS INCREASE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DATA PROBLEM AS THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THESE PROPOSALS CONSTITUTE THE FIRST MOVE BY THE EAST OF REAL SIGNIFICANCE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

B. ISSUES ON WHICH THE EASTERN POSITION HAS CHANGED

1. THE EAST HAS DROPPED ITS REQUIREMENT FOR REDUCTIONS IN AIR MANPOWER AND HAS THUS ACCEPTED THAT THE FOCUS OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE ON GROUND FORCES. IT HAS ALSO AGREED THAT A CEILING WOULD BE PLACED ON TOTAL GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER.

2. THE EAST HAS FORMALLY ACCEPTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00330 01 OF 02 101157Z

OUTCOME OF NUMERICAL EQUALITY ON EACH SIDE FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER THROUGH REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE COMPUTED AS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF EACH SIDE AND A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AT 700,000 MEN. THIS MEANS THAT, ON PAPER, THE EAST HAS ADOPTED THE REDUCTION CONCEPT PROPOSED BY THE WEST. HOWEVER, THIS ASPECT OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS IS OF QUESTIONABLE PRACTICAL VALUE AT PRESENT BECAUSE THE EASTERN PROPOSALS ARE PREDICATED ON WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF EASTERN TABLED DATA WHICH THE WEST REJECTS.

3. THE EAST HAS ACCEPTED FOR PHASE I THE CONCEPT OF REDUCTION OF SELECTED AND DIFFERENT ARMAMENTS FOR THE US AND USSR RATHER THAN EQUAL REDUCTION OF THE SAME ARMAMENTS ON EITHER SIDE.

4. THE EAST HAS NOW OFFERED TO WITHDRAW 1,000 SOVIET TANKS INSTEAD OF THE 1,700 TANK WITHDRAWAL PROPOSED BY THE WEST. BUT, IN RETURN, IT IS REQUIRING THAT THE WEST MAINTAIN ITS ORIGINAL PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW ALL THE ELEMENTS IN THE ORIGINAL WESTERN NUCLEAR OFFER. AS REGARDS ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II, THE EAST HAS MADE CLEAR THAT IT CONTINUES TO SEEK

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00330 02 OF 02 101210Z
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SS-15 TRSE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00
ACDE-00 /078 W

-----021922 101220Z /14

O P 101123Z JUN 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2928
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0330

SOME ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS BY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.
FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES, THE EAST HAS INTRODUCED A NEW PROVISION
WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE USSR AND THE US TO WITHDRAW FROM THEIR
PHASE I COMMITMENTS IF THEY ARE NOT SATISFIED THAT NON-US
AND NON-SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II CONFORM TO THE PATTERN OF
US AND SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS AS REGARDS REDUCTIONS BY UNITS
AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. OF COURSE, REVOCATION OF SOVIET
PHASE I TANK REDUCTIONS WOULD PERMIT THE US TO REVOKE ITS
PHASE I NUCLEAR WITHDRAWALS, AND THE USSR WOULD HAVE TO
CONSIDER THIS POSSIBILITY IN MAKING ANY DECISION TO REVOKE
ITS TANK WITHDRAWALS.

9. THE EAST IS OFFERING THAT PHASE I REDUCTIONS OF
US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER SHOULD BE COMPUTED BY
TAKING AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL STRENGOH OF EACH OF
THESE FORCES, I.E. A 2:1 RATIO OF SOVIET TO US MANPOWER
WITHDRAWALS IN THAT PHASE. THIS IS THE SAME CONCEPTUAL BASIS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00330 02 OF 02 101210Z

ON WHICH THE WEST ORIGINALLY COMPUTED ITS PROPOSALS FOR PHASE I US-SOVIET WITHDRAWALS. HOWEVER, THE PERCENTAGE PROPOSED BY THE EAST IS ONLY 7 PERCENT, AND NOT THE 15 PERCENT SOUGHT BY THE WEST. MOREOVER, THIS FEATURE DOES NOT ALTER THE OVERALL REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE EAST IN BOTH PHASES.

6. THE EAST HAS ALSO ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THAT AGREED MANPOWER CEILINGS SHOULD BE OF A COLLECTIVE NATURE, AND IT APPEARS TO HAVE DROPPED ITS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN NATIONAL CEILINGS AT POST REDUCTION LEVELS. HOWEVER, UPPER LIMITS ON NATIONAL MANPOWER LEVELS REMAIN PART OF THE EASTERN SCHEME UNDER THE PROCEDURE STATES IN PARA 8 OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. THE EAST ALSO CONTINUES TO INSIST ON NATIONAL REDUCTION COMMITMENTS IN THE FORM OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS COMMITMENTS BY THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON EACH SIDE. THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDE THAT THE USSR AND THE USA WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME ARRANGEMENT FOR SUCH UPPER LIMITS OF NATIONAL MANPOWER LEVELS IN THE AREA AS OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE NEW PROPOSALS REJECT THE WESTERN APPROACH THAT US AND SOVIET MANPOWER ALONE BE LIMITED AT THEIR RESIDUAL LEVEL.

7. THE EAST HAS ALSO PROPOSED THAT SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I WOULD INCLUDE TWO DIVISIONS, BUT HAVE NOT AGREED TO REDUCE FIVE DIVISIONS, AS REQUIRED IN THE WESTERN INITIATIVE.

C. NEW ISSUES RAISED BY THE EASTERN PROPOSALS

1. THE EAST IS REQUESTING A FREEZE ON THE NUMBER OF MILITARY POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY CIVILIANS IN PEACETIME FOR EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT.

2. THE EAST HAS PROPOSED LIMITS FOR BOTH SIDES ON FORMATIONS SUBJECT TO REDUCTIONS.

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00330 02 OF 02 101210Z

D. ADDITIONAL POINTS

1. THE EAST HAS STATED THAT ALL ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN POSITION NOT DEALT WITH IN THE NEW PROPOSALS REMAIN AS PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED.

2. THE EAST CONTINUES TO TREAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ALIKE, AS REGARDS REDUCTION COMMITMENTS, MANPOWER CEILINGS, ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS, AND THE FORM OF REDUCTIONS (THAT IS, BY UNITS), REGARDLESS OF GEOGRAPHY AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SITUATION OF PARTICIPANTS WITH THEIR TERRITORY IN THE AREA AND THOSE LOCATED OUTSIDE IT.

3. ALTHOUGH THE EAST NEVER INDICATED OPPOSITION TO SUCH

A CONCEPT, IT HAS ALSO MOVED TO AGREE TO THE WEST'S PROPOSAL
NOT TO PLACE RESTRICTIONS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OR LOCATION OF
MILITARY FORMATIONS IN HE REDUCTION AREA AFTER PHASE I
AND PHASE II REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGREEMENT DRAFT, REPORTS, DISARMAMENT
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 10 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978MBFRV00330
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780243-0427
Format: TEL
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780673/aaaacktj.tel
Line Count: 230
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 2ab0bf8b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2405492
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS
TAGS: PARM, GC, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/2ab0bf8b-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014